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TAXATION
Cynthia M. Ohlenforst *
Jeff W. Dorrill **
I. SALES TAX
A. Application of the Tax***
N Dixon v. State I the Austin court of appeals affirmed a lower court's
holding that an individual was liable for a corporation's unpaid taxes
even though the corporation had not lost its charter.2 Although Dixon
involved a fuel tax liability,3 its holding should also apply to sales tax liabili-
ties. However, because the corporation collected taxes but failed to pay
them to the state, the court's rationale 4 should not be construed to hold
corporate officers liable for the taxes that a corporation has not collected.
Nevertheless, the court's decision evidences the attorney-general's expanding
effort to hold individuals responsible for unpaid corporate taxes. The Austin
court of appeals confirmed in Bullock v. Foley Brothers Dry Goods Corp.5
that the state may collect sales tax from either the buyer or the seller. 6
The United States Supreme Court again faced the question of whether a
state must provide relief to taxpayers who paid taxes pursuant to a statute
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas,
Texas.
*** Cases, regulations and other developments that fell within this survey period but were
included in last year's survey article are not included in this article. See Cynthia M.
Ohlenforst & Jeff W. Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 647 (1991).
1. 808 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
2. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (Vernon 1982) (corporate officers may become
liable for debts of corporation, including taxes, when the corporation forfeits its charter for
failure to pay taxes). See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 26,398 (Oct. 18, 1990). The United
States Tax Court recently held that when a state revokes a corporation's charter, the corpora-
tion ceases to exist as a legal entity and may no longer petition the Tax Court. Vahlco Corp. v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. (No. 29) (1991) (relying on Texas law).
3. 808 S.W.2d at 722; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 153.101, 153.201 (Vernon Supp.
1992) (imposing a tax on the first sale of fuel).
4. The court held that TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon Supp. 1992), which
provides that any person who collects a tax holds the amount collected in trust for the state
and is liable for the full amount (plus penalties and interest), imposes a fiduciary relationship
between the state as principal and the tax collecting entity as agent. Dixon, 808 S.W.2d at 723.
According to the court, a corporate officer "is liable for any tort committed by the corporation
through him, regardless of whether the officer personally benefits from the tort committed."
Id.
5. 802 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.- Austin 1991, writ denied). This decision, which was
summarized at Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1991 Survey at 649 (1991), was originally designated by
the court as not for publication.
6. Id. at 838-39.
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that is subsequently declared unconstitutional. In James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia 7 a divided court held that taxpayers whose claims are not
barred by procedural requirements, such as statutes of limitation or res judi-
cata, are entitled to retroactive application of the court's holding that Geor-
gia's alcoholic beverage tax is unconstitutional. 8 In another state tax case,
Dennis v. Higgins,9 the United States Supreme Court held that taxpayers
may bring certain claims under a civil rights statute10 that permits an award
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party."1
A significant issue facing Texas and other states in 1992 concerns the abil-
ity of a state to impose sales or use taxes on mail order sales. The landmark
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Revenue 12 has long stood
for the proposition that states may not impose sales or use taxes on mail-
order sales. As catalog sales have expanded rapidly throughout the country,
National Bellas Hess has been questioned with increased frequency. 13 Two
lower court cases in Tennessee held out-of-state mail order sellers liable for
sales taxes on goods sold to Tennessee residents. 14 In North Dakota v. Quill
Corp. ' 5 that state's supreme court accepted the state's broad definition for
use tax purposes of "retailer"'16 and concluded that imposition of state use
tax on an out-of-state direct marketing retailer was permissible even though
the retailer had no physical presence in the state.17 The court's conclusion
rested in part on its determination that the "economic, social, and commer-
cial landscape upon which Bellas Hess was premised no longer exists, save
perhaps in the fertile imaginations of attorneys representing mail order inter-
ests."' 18 The United States Supreme Court has accepted certiorari on
Quill,'9 and the Texas legislature has already enacted language similar to
the North Dakota statute.20
On the other hand, in Direct Marketing Association, Inc. v. Bennett2' a
7. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
8. 111 S. Ct. at 2448.
9. 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). The court held that Commerce Clause claims concerning
state taxes may be brought under this 1871 civil rights statute, which provides a cause of action
against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another person of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Dennis,
111 S. Ct. at 868.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
12. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
13. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
14. Bloomingdale's by Mail, Ltd. v. Huddleston (No. 89-3017-II) (Tenn. Chanc. Ct.)
(March 8, 1991); SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Huddleston (No. 89-0315-III) (March 11,
1991).
15. 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991) (cert. granted in part 112 S. Ct. 49 (Oct. 7, 1991)).
16. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01 (1991 Supp.), which includes within the defini-
tion of retailer "every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer
market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or other
advertising, or by means of print, radio or television media, by mail, telegraphy, telephone,
computer data base, cable, optic, microwave or other communication system."
17. 470 N.W.2d at 215.
18. Id. at 208.
19. 112 S. Ct. 49.
20. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
21. No. CIVS-88-1067, MLS, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10736 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 1991).
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California court, relying on National Bellas Hess,22 concluded there is an
insufficient nexus for imposing the state tax "where the only connection with
customers in the taxing state is by common carrier or the United States
mail." 23
As during past survey periods, the comptroller issued far too many ad-
ministrative decisions and letters to taxpayers to review in this survey. How-
ever, a brief overview of a few decisions illustrates some recurring
substantive issues. Several decisions focused on the sales tax exemption for
occasional sales.24 Although the relevant administrative rule25 allows a
buyer to claim an exemption for an acquisition of all operating assets of a
business (or of a separate division, branch or segment of a business) 26 and
further provides that operating assets do not include "assets maintained and
used for general business purposes in addition to use by the specific enter-
prise,"' 27 there is some uncertainty concerning the availability of the exemp-
tion to a buyer who buys less than all the assets of a business or of a segment
of a business. However, in Decision 26,44328 the administrative law judge
found that assets used for company-wide accounting were not operating as-
sets of the particular segment purchased, and permitted a sales tax exemp-
tion notwithstanding the taxpayer's not having purchased those assets. The
administrative law judge in Decision 26,52029 correctly concluded that the
purchaser of a segment of a business (rather than of the entire business) is
not liable for the seller's taxes under the successor liability rules. 30 Other
decisions addressed the prior contract rule,3 ' extended the circumstances in
22. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
23. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *3.
24. See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
25. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316 (1984).
26. Id. § 3.316(d)(1).
27. Id. § 3.316(d)(3).
28. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,443 (Feb. 5, 1991).
29. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,520 (Feb. 7, 1991).
30. However, the comptroller has drafted, but not yet proposed, a new Rule 3.7 concern-
ing liability incurred by a purchaser of a business which provides that a person who "sells the
business or stock of goods of a business or quits the business" for purposes of this successor
liability statute includes, but is not limited to, the person who sells the capital assets of a
business, sells the inventory of a business, sells the name and goodwill of a business or sells
capital assets, inventory or name and goodwill of a separate division, branch or identifiable
segment of a business.
31. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (1990). Recent administrative decisions appear to
expand this rule; see, e.g., Comptroller Hearing Nos. 27,421 (June 26, 1991) (agreements
signed by customer but not by seller were enforceable under state law and qualified for prior
contract status, notwithstanding administrative requirement in Rule 3.319(a)(2) that contracts
be signed by both parties); 26,321 (Dec. 19, 1990) (price list agreements treated as "as needed"
contracts eligible for prior contract exemption); 26,510 (Oct. 2, 1991) (holding invalid, in the




which use tax is imposed;32 and dealt with taxable services,33 successor lia-
bility,34 and numerous other issues. 35
B. Legislative and Regulatory Developments
House Bill 11,36 enacted during the Texas legislature's first 1991 special
session, made many significant changes to Texas sales and use taxes.3 7 Pur-
suant to newly created chapter 160 of the Tax Code,38 a new Texas sales and
use tax is imposed on every retail sale of a taxable boat or motor sold in
Texas.3 9 The new tax rate is 6.25 percent of the total consideration paid.40
In addition, new Texas residents who bring a taxable boat or motor into the
state are required to pay a one-time $15 tax for each such taxable boat or
motor.
41
The list of taxable services was expanded to include telephone answering
32. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,653 (Jul. 26, 1991), for example, focused on a taxpayer
that bought materials outside Texas and, through a manufacturing process that occured
outside Texas, converted the materials into building components that were then brought into
Texas. The taxpayer argued that use tax should not be imposed on the materials because the
materials were never used in Texas. The administrative law judge concluded, however, that
use tax nonetheless is due, and that holding otherwise would place Texas sellers at a competi-
tive disadvantage. See also, Comptroller Hearing No. 26,951 (Apr. 12, 1991) (use tax imposed
on machine purportedly held for sale by taxpayer because taxpayer had claimed depreciation
on the machine for federal income tax purposes); Comptroller Hearing No. 26,321 (Dec. 19,
1990) (computer data storage on discs physically stored in Virginia resulted in Texas use tax
because charges were for services that benefitted Texas customers); Comptroller Hearing No.
26,279 (Feb. 11, 1991) (use tax due on out-of-state repairs to property to be used in Texas).
33. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,337 (June 26, 1991), for example, illustrates the difficulty
of distinguishing between new construction and remodeling. Acknowledging that the distinc-
tion is unclear, the administrative law judge concluded that new construction should be de-
fined narrowly so that it includes only new structures or the addition of square footage, and
that real property repair and remodeling should be construed broadly enough to include other
improvements. Several other decisions focus on this distinction. See, e.g., Comptroller Hear-
ing Nos. 26,660 (June 11, 1991) (completion of building following demolition phase held re-
modeling); 27,683 (July 30, 1991) (alterations to building finished out 50 years after
construction constituted remodeling). See generally Bruskin & Porter, State Sales Taxes on
Services: Massachusetts As a Case Study, 45 TAX LAW. 49 (1991) (concerning the difficulty of
determining how and to what extent a state may tax professional services).
34. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 26,933 (July 2, 1991) (focusing on whether succes-
sor had intended to buy "a business" and concluding that he had not, and that he was not
liable for taxes).
35. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 26,144 (Dec. 4, 1990) (resale exemption for air-
plane sales not available because planes were not purchased to be resold "in the normal course
of [the parties'] business - beer distribution and banking").
36. Act of Aug. 22, 1991, ch 5, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (1st C.S.) 134 (Vernon) (hereaf-
ter, H.B. 11).
37. Although the limited sales and use tax rate did not change in 1991, the Texas hotel
occupancy tax and the motor vehicle and interstate motor carrier sales and use taxes increased
to 6.25 percent from 6.0 percent. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 152.021(b), 152.028(b), 156.052,
and 157.102 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
38. Id. §§ 160.001-.122.
39. Id. §§ 160.021(a), 160.022(a). The term "taxable boat or motor" generally means (i)
boats other than those designed to be propelled by paddle, oar or pole, or (ii) outboard motors.
Id. § 160.001(8).
40. Id. §§ 160.021(b), 160.022(a). The 6.25 percent sales and use tax is an obligation of
the purchaser or user. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 160.021(a), and .022(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
41. Id. § 160.023.
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services and wash and detail services.42 However, car wash services by cer-
tain exempt organizations are not taxable.43
House Bill 11 repealed the exemption from sales and use tax that previ-
ously existed for internal and external wrapping, packing, and packaging
supplies sold to a person for use, stored for use in furthering the sale of the
product wrapped, packed or packaged, or furthering the distribution of any
newspaper, whether it is distributed with or without charge.44 The terms
"wrapping," "packing," and "packaging supplies" are defined very
broadly. 45
There was quite a furor over this legislative change, and in response, the
comptroller adopted on an emergency basis a rule which alleviates many of
taxpayers' concerns. 46 The rule provides sales or use tax is not due on con-
tainers or packaging supplies purchased by manufacturers for use as part of
the completion of the manufacturing process. 47 However, sales or use tax is
due on the sale of packaging supplies to "persons who repack tangible per-
sonal property prior to sale, produce shippers who are not original produ-
cers, wholesalers, retailers, and service providers for use . . ." in the
performance of services, the rental of tangible personal property, or the sale
of tangible personal property.4 The rule further provides that sales or use
tax is not due on containers when sold with the contents, if sales or use tax is
not due on the sales price of the contents.49
Prior to the enactment of House Bill 11, section 151.31150 exempted from
sales and use tax tangible personal property purchased by a contractor if
used in the performance of a contract for the improvement of realty for (i)
the State of Texas, (ii) a county, city, special district, or other political subdi-
vision of the State of Texas, (iii) exempt religious, educational or public ser-
vice organizations or (iv) in certain circumstances, the Department of
Defense. 51 Under the new law, this exemption applies only if the construc-
42. Id. § 151.0101(a)(15), (16). The term "telephone answering services" does not in-
clude the automated receiving and relaying of telephone messages included within the defini-
tion of telecommunications services. Id. § 151.0102.
43. Id. § 151.350. The phrase "telephone answering services" is defined as the receiving
and relaying of telephone messages by a human operator. Id. § 151.0102. The term "wash
and detail services" means services purchased at a car wash, or the full-service cleaning of the
exterior or interior of a motor vehicle. Id. § 151.0105.
44. See TEXAS TAX CODE ANN.§ 151.321 (Vernon 1982) (repealed by Act of Aug. 22,
1991, ch. 5, § 14.12(3), 1991 Tex Sess. Law Serv. (1st C.S.) 190 (Vernon )). The resale, manu-
facturing, container and newspaper exemptions have also been amended to effect the repeal of
this former exemption. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.302(c), .318(c)(5), .319(e)(5) and
.322(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
45. Id. § 151.302(d).
46. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.314 (eff. Oct. 1, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 5446).
47. Id. § 3.314(b)(1).
48. Id. § 3.314(c).
49. Id. § 3.314(e)(1). The rule also provides certain exemptions for "export packers,"
which are persons who package property to be exported outside the United States territorial
limits, and makes distinctions between returnable and non-returnable containers. Id.
§ 3.314(c)(2), (3).
50. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (as in effect prior to amend-




tion is for school districts or certain non-profit hospitals. 52 This legislation
had a dramatic impact on the construction industry, and industry represent-
atives quickly sought, and received, assurance from the comptroller that
materials used in construction projects for tax-exempt entities other than
school districts and hospitals may nonetheless be purchased and used tax
free if the underlying construction contract is a "separated contract. ' ' 3
Amended section 151.31854 of the Tax Code alters the phase-in of the man-
ufacturing exemption. 55 The revised section provides that equipment used
or consumed in the manufacturing process will be eligible for a complete or
partial exemption from sales and use tax pursuant to the following schedule:
(i) for manufacturing equipment purchased after September 30, 1993 and
before January 1, 1994, the exemption equals fifty percent of the sales price;
(ii) for manufacturing equipment purchased during 1994, the exemption
equals seventy-five percent of the sales price; and (iii) for manufacturing
purchased in 1995 and after, there is a complete exemption.5 6 Prior to this
1991 amendment, the phase-in of the exemption was more rapid. There was
a twenty-five percent exemption in 1991 and 1992 (although in 1991 the
exemption was in the form of a refund) and a fifty percent exemption
throughout 1993, with the same exemption as exists under the new legisla-
tion for 1994 and thereafter. 57 This delay in the phase-in of the exemption is
somewhat ameliorated by the new franchise tax credit for sales taxes paid on
manufacturing equipment.58
In order to broaden the scope of persons required to collect and remit
sales tax, the Texas legislature broadened the definitions of "sellers" and
"retailers" to include any person engaging in regular or systematic solicita-
tion of sales of taxable items in Texas by the distribution of catalogs, periodi-
cals, advertising flyers or other advertising, by means of print, radio or
television media, or by mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer data base,
cable, optic, microwave, or other communication system for the purpose of
effecting taxable sales. 59 The legislature similarly revamped the definition of
"retailer engaged in business in this state." 6°
The sales and use tax on taxable real property services was amended to
exempt the removal or collection of hazardous wastes, industrial solid wastes
52. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
53. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291 (eff. Sept. 13, 1988, 13 Tex. Reg. 4097) (explaining
the difference between separated and lump-sum contracts).
54. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 151.318(h).
57. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(h) (Vernon Supp 1992) (as in effect prior to amend-
ment by Act of 1991, ch. 5, § 14.081, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (Ist C.S.) 189-90 (Vernon)).
58. For a discussion of the new franchise tax credit for sales taxes paid on manufacturing
equipment, see notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
The Texas legislature also narrowed the exemption for amusement services exclusively pro-
vided by nonprofit corporations or associations. The exemption now does not apply to entities
described under Section 501(c)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e., certain clubs organized
for pleasure, recreation and other nonprofitable purposes). TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3101
(Vernon Supp. 1992).
59. Id. § 151.008(b)(5).
60. Id. § 151. 107(a)(4). This change adopts language similar to the North Dakota statute
2098 [Vol. 45
TAXATION
and certain other waste materials. 61 Certain other exemptions were added
to benefit the deaf and blind.62 The natural gas exemption is now limited to
natural gas that is taxed as a motor fuel.63 Tangible personal property trans-
ferred as an integral part of an exempt service may not be purchased for
resale. 64 Pursuant to new section 151.06065 of the Tax Code, a person re-
pairing a motor vehicle is treated as the seller of all tangible personal prop-
erty consumed in providing the repairs, and as seller, the repair person must
collect tax from the consumer on such property.66 However, if the contract
between the repair person and the customer contains a lump-sum price cov-
ering services and tangible personal property, the repair person is treated as
the consumer.67
As in past years, the comptroller issued new regulations and made signifi-
cant revisions to others. The purpose of some of the new rules and revisions
was to make regulations consistent with new legislation. For example, an
emergency rule was adopted to reflect the 1991 legislation that imposes a
sales and use tax on purchases of taxable boats and boat motors. 68 In addi-
tion, amended emergency Rule 3.31069 provides that wrapping and packag-
ing supplies (such as clothes hangers and bags) used by those providing
laundry or dry cleaning services, which supplies are transferred to the cus-
tomer with the laundered or cleaned item, are not exempt.70 Amended
Rule 3.28571 provides that tax is due on an item removed from a tax-free
inventory for use in Texas.72 The rule also makes clear that a purchaser may
give a resale certificate on the purchase of an item which the purchaser in-
tends to sell, lease or rent as an integral part of a taxable service. 73 The
at issue in State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1990), cert. granted in part, 112 S. Ct.
49 (Oct. 7, 1991). See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
House Bill 11 also eliminated the $25 sales tax permit fee. TEX TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.201(d) (repealed by Act of 1991, ch. 5, § 14.12(1), 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (1st C.S.)
190 (Vernon)).
61. Id. § 151.0048.
62. Pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.313(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992), a light signal
and device to adapt certain items for the deaf,, and adaptive devices or software for computers
used by deaf persons, are exempt.
63. Id. § 151.308(b).
64. Id. § 151.346(e).
65. Id. § 151.060.
66. Id. § 151.060(a). However, the repair person is not considered to be the seller of
electricity and gas. Id. § 151.060(a).
67. Id. § 151.060(b).
68. 34 TEX ADMIN. CODE § 3.741 (eff. Feb. 5, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 475).
69. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.310 (eff. Jan. 1, 1992, 16 Tex. Reg. 7360).
70. Id. § 3.310(d). See also supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text discussing Rule
3.314, which addresses the sales and use tax on wrapping and packaging supplies.
In addition to these rule changes based on new legislation, an emergency amendment has
been made to the rule addressing the calculation of the proportioned sales and use tax applied
to motor vehicles of interstate carriers to reflect the recent increase in tax rates applied to such
carriers. 34 TEX ADMIN. CODE § 3.444 (eff. Feb. 5, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 474).
71. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285 (eff. Sept. 18, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 4957).
72. Id. § 3.285(e)(1).
73. Id. § 3.285(b)(3). Under the prior rule, a resale certificate could not be given if, at the
time of purchase, the purchaser did not know whether the item would be resold, leased, rented
or used for some other purpose. See 16 Tex. Reg. 3245.
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comptroller made other important changes with respect to resale certificates
in Rules 3.282, 74 3.285, 75 and 3.287.76
Rule 3.253, 77 as amended, broadened the types of activities that cause a
retailer to be engaged in business within a county and thereby subject to the
county use tax.78 Rules 3.42579 and 3.37580 were similarly amended to
change the definition of "engaged in business" for transit and city use tax
purposes.8 1 Rule 3.31382 was amended to provide that cable television ser-
vice connection fees are taxable.8 3 The rule defining data processing serv-
ices was amended to clarify that interpretive and enhancement geophysical
services are not taxable data processing services.84 Rule 3.346,85 addressing
the use tax, was amended to implement 86 legislation following a United
States Supreme Court decision upholding the imposition of the Louisiana
use tax on catalogs shipped from outside the state to Louisiana residents.87
New Rule 3.35988 addresses the sales and use tax responsibilities of repair
persons of motor vehicles and aircraft. 89 The rule addressing exempt organi-
zations was amended by adding a new subsection which provides a list of
entities that must prove exempt status.90
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. Liability for Tax - Doing Business in Texas
In Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc.,91 the Texas supreme court reversed an
appellate decision 92 that had been a significant victory for taxpayers. Tax-
payers argued that the comptroller had construed the "doing business" stan-
dard to exclude companies whose only ties to Texas were sales effected by
independent contractors, that the legislature had re-enacted the franchise tax
without changing this standard, and that the comptroller could therefore not
change his interpretation without clear statutory authority.9 3 However, the
74. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.282 (eff. Sept. 16, 1991, 16 Tex Reg. 4844).
75. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.285.
76. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.287 (eff. Sept. 10, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 4681). Among other
changes, these rules tightened verification procedures for resale certificates. See 34 TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE ANN. §§ 3.282, 295, 3.297.
77. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.253 (eff. Sept 10, 1991, 16 Tex Reg. 4681).
78. Id.
79. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.425 (eff. Sept. 10, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 4682).
80. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.375 (eff. Sept. 10, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 4681).
81. Id. § 3.375(a)(1).
82. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.313 (eff. June 25, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 3195).
83. Id. § 3.313(b)(1).
84. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (eff. Feb. 28, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 987).
85. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.346 (eff. Dec. 21, 1991, 15 Tex. Reg. 7029).
86. § 3.346(b)(3).
87. Id.; see D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamera, 486 U.S. 24 (1988).
88. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.359 (eff. Oct. 7, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 5216).
89. Id.
90. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.322(b) (eff. Sept. 10, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 4681).
91. 815 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1991).
92. Bullock v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App. -Austin 1990), rev'd,
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1990 Survey at 655-56 for a summary
of Bullock v. House of Lloyd.
93. 805 S.W.2d at 248; 797 S.W.2d at 135.
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Supreme Court concluded that the statute extends to corporations effecting
sales through independent contractors, 94 that the comptroller had never af-
firmatively adopted an agency policy to the contrary, 95 and that he had no
discretion to adopt a policy inconsistent with the legislature's intent to tax
such businesses.96 The decision is a disappointing one for taxpayers, not
only because it reverses a favorable and well-reasoned appellate decision, but
also because it accords so little weight to longstanding comptroller enforce-
ment policies. (The parties had stipulated that the comptroller had, prior to
1983, never interpreted the "doing business" requirement to impose a tax on
foreign corporations that effected sales in Texas through independent con-
tractors. 97) The decision is also noteworthy for its apparent conclusion that,
notwithstanding the long history of contested cases and revised interpreta-
tions from the comptroller, the statutory "doing business" standard is not
ambiguous. 98
B. Calculation and Allocation of Taxable Capital
Several administrative decisions focused on the calculation of surplus. In
Decision 25,528, 99 for example, a taxpayer was permitted to establish by
evidence other than its financial books and records that a loan to its parent
corporation should be treated as a loan to the taxpayer. Decision 26,751100
required a taxpayer to include in surplus certain liability accounts set up for
warranty and product liability expenses, and for pension and other post-re-
tirement benefits.' 0 1 The administrative law judge relied heavily in reaching
his decision on the fact that the account amounts were estimates rather than
exact amounts. The comptroller also confirmed, in Decisions 23,873 and
26,405,102 his view that pre-acquisition earnings of second-tier and lower-
tier subsidiaries must be included in surplus.
Decision 24,365103 held invalid a regulatory requirement that taxpayers
use a particular accounting method for investment tax credit in computing
94. 805 S.W.2d at 248.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 249.
97. Id. at 247.
98. Id. at 248.
99. Comptroller Hearing No. 25,528 (April 17, 1991).
100. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,751 (Feb. 7, 1991).
101. The legislature specifically required inclusion of certain retirement benefits in surplus
by its 1991 revisions to the Texas Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(j)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1992). The amendatory statute recites that the employee benefit inclusion in
surplus is intended to be a "clarification of existing law and not a substantive change" (H.B.
11, art. 8, § 8.081), although the accuracy of that statement is open to question. See also
Comptroller Hearing No. 26,424 (May 2, 1991) (holding a reserve for layoff and plant closing
employee benefits includable in surplus). However, in the past the comptroller apparently
permitted taxpayers to exclude retirement benefits that were vested, even if such benefits had
not actually been paid during the tax year.
102. Comptroller Hearing Nos. 23,873 and 26,405 (Apr. 29, 1991). This decision, which
the administrative law judge found consistent with State v. Sun Refining & Marketing, 740
S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin, writ denied), also required inclusion in surplus of first tier
subsidiary formed to acquire target corporation.
103. Comptroller Hearing No. 24,365 (Dec. 6, 1990).
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taxable surplus; 104 the administrative law judge found that the rule exceeded
the comptroller's rulemaking authority by prohibiting the taxpayer from us-
ing a method permitted by the Tax Code. 105
C. Legislative Developments
The franchise tax changes enacted by the Texas legislature this summer as
part of House Bill 11106 were the product of a last-minute furor of drafting
and compromising. These changes reflect both the accomplishment of
avoiding a disastrous budget shortfall and the failure of enacting a bill
marred by confusing provisions and drafting errors. As amended, the
franchise tax effectively imposes an income tax on many corporations.
1. Entities subject to tax.
According to section 171.001 of the Tax Code, 10 7 Texas franchise tax
applies to:
(1) each corporation that does business in this state or that is
chartered or authorized to do business in this state, and
(2) each limited liability company that does business in this state or
that is organized under the laws of this state or is authorized to do
business in this state. 108
The definitional sections make clear that the tax applies to banking corpo-
rations, 1°9 limited liability companies, 110 and savings and loans.' Banks
have been subject to the tax for several years, 112 but savings and loan as-
sociations had previously been exempt. 113 The legislature tightened the
104. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.405(e)(2).
105. Comptroller Hearing No. 24,365 (Dec. 6, 1990).
106. See supra note 36.
107. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
108. Id. § 171.001(a)(l), (2).
109. Id. § 171.001(b)(l) ("banking corporation" includes each state, national, domestic, or
foreign bank, and each bank organized under 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-31 (section 25(a) of the Federal
Reserve Act), but does not include bank holding companies as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 1841
(section (2) of the Bank Holding Act of 1956)).
110. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(b)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (the term "corpora-
tion" includes a limited liability company as defined under the Texas Limited Liability Com-
pany Act (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (Vernon Supp. 1992)). This definition
could allow an argument that a limited liability company organized under the law of another
state is not subject to the tax. However, references in the Texas Limited Liability Act to
foreign limited liability companies (see, e.g., art. 1.02(9) of the Texas act which defines "For-
eign Limited Liability Company") indicate that the Texas act contemplates not only limited
liability companies organized under the Texas act, but also those organized under the laws of
other states. Moreover, the Tax Code statement that franchise tax is imposed on "each limited
liability company that does business in this state or that is organized under the laws of this
state or is authorized to do business in this state" (TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)(2))
parallels the references to corporations in section 171.001(a)(l), which encompasses both do-
mestic and foreign entities.
111. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(b)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Note that former
TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 171.054 (that exempted savings and loan associations from the
franchise tax) was repealed by H.B. 11, art. 8, § 8.24.
112. The legislature repealed the exemption from franchise tax for banks (formerly TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 171.078) in 1984. Acts 1984, 68th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 31, art. 3, part B.
113. See supra note I11.
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rules applicable to tax exempt entities by terminating the franchise tax ex-
emption more quickly for corporations whose federal exemption is
terminated. ' 1 4
Although the legislature considered adopting a franchise tax that would
have applied to all business entities, 115 the tax as finally enacted does not
extend to partnerships, joint ventures, trusts,' " 6 sole proprietorships or lim-
ited liability partnerships." 17 Some businesses may, therefore, be able to es-
cape the tax by conducting business through noncorporate vehicles,
including limited partnerships comprised of corporations. As more compa-
nies strive to shield corporate limited partners from the franchise tax, the
comptroller may have more incentive than ever to assert that a limited part-
nership or its general partner is an agent for its corporate limited partners or
that the corporate limited partners are otherwise doing business in Texas.
Because the legislature retained the "doing business" standard for impos-
ing franchise tax on foreign corporations," 18existing law continues to apply
in determining which entities are subject to Texas franchise jurisdiction.
However, Public Law 86-272,' 9 a federal law that limits states' ability to
impose a net income tax on taxpayers whose only ties to the taxing state are
certain limited solicitation activities, will limit the franchise tax to the extent
it is computed by reference to a corporation's net taxable earned surplus.
Thus, some taxpayers may be subject to Texas jurisdiction for purposes of
the tax on capital but not for purposes of a tax on income.
Congress enacted Public Law 86-272 in 1959120 to prohibit a state from
imposing a net income tax on the income derived within the state by any
114. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.063(g) (Vernon Supp. 1992), as revised by H.B. 11, pro-
vides that if a corporation's federal tax exemption is withdrawn by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice because the corporation has failed to qualify or maintain qualification for exemption, the
corporation's exemption from franchise tax ends on the withdrawal date. Prior law had al-
lowed the exemption to continue until April 30 (the end of the regular franchise tax annual
period) following the withdrawal.
115. See, e.g., House Bill 1553 (introduced by Rep. James Hury).
116. However, certain REITS (Real Estate Investment Trusts) incorporated under state
law are subject to tax.
117. The 1991 legislature also created registered limited liability partnerships (TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 45-A (Vernon Supp. 1992)) to allow general partners protection
from liability for the "errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence or malfeasance" committed
in the course of partnership business by another partner or representative "not working under
the supervision or direction of such partner" provided the partnership complies with certain
statutory requirements. The Tax Code does not extend the franchise tax to limited liability
partnerships.
118. It is now well-established that the threshold for "doing business" for franchise tax
purposes is much lower than the "transacting business" standard for TBCA purposes. See,
e.g., Comptroller Decision No. 10,216 (Aug. 19, 1981) (comptroller interpretation that TBCA
art. 8.01 exclusions from "transacting business" do not apply to "doing business" test). Subse-
quent decisions made clear that the standards are different. See also, supra notes 91-98 and
accompanying text.
119. Pub. L. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (West 1976).
120. Several court cases construing Public Law 86-272 offer a good overview of its history
and purpose. See generally, Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275
(1972); William Wrigley, Jr. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 465 N.W.2d 800 (Wis. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 49 (U.S. 1991) (No. 91,194) (oral argument Jan. 22, 1991) (case dis-
cusses development of the law).
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person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such
state are "the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent
outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by
shipment or delivery from a point outside the State"1 21 or similar solicitation
for a prospective customer. 122  This prohibition, which does not extend to
corporations incorporated under the laws of the taxing state 123 or to individ-
uals who are domiciled in or residents of the taxing state, 124 is likely to result
in significant interpretative problems as the comptroller is required, for the
first time, to incorporate the Public Law 86-272 restrictions into his
regulations. 125
2. Calculation of the tax.
The revised franchise tax, which is technically a combination of a tax on
net taxable capital and a tax on net taxable earned surplus, is generally the
greater of 0.25% per year of privilege period of net taxable capital or 4.5%
of "net taxable earned surplus."' 26 The part of the new tax that is based on
taxable capital is a modification of the old franchise tax, although the legisla-
ture further expanded taxable capital by requiring taxpayers to calculate sur-
plus without reduction for deferred income taxes, 127 deferred investment tax
credit,128 or liabilities for compensation and other non-wage employee bene-
121. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (West 1976).
122. Id. § 381(a)(2).
123. Id. § 381(b).
124. Id.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 381 further provides that a person will not be considered to have engaged
in business activities in a state during a taxable year
merely by reason of sales in such State, or the solicitation of orders for such sales
in such State, of tangible personal property on behalf of such person by one or
more independent contractors, or by reason of the maintenance, of an office in
such State by one or more independent contractors whose activities on behalf of
such person in such State consist solely of making sales, or soliciting orders for
sales, of tangible personal property.
This restriction undercuts the comptroller's ability to extend the earned surplus component of
the tax to taxpayers subject to Texas jurisdiction under the rationale of Sharp v. House of
Lloyd.
126. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002 (Vernon Supp. 1992). Neither the capital tax nor
the earned surplus tax can be a negative number for purposes of this calculation. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Treating a portion of the tax as a tax on
capital is intended to help taxpayers who claim a credit in other states for taxes paid on capital.
Although the tax is generally the same for all entities, specialized rules apply to certain taxpay-
ers. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1031 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (for apportionment of
taxable capital and taxable earned surplus of banking corporations and savings and loan asso-
ciation taxpayers, interest and dividends received are gross receipts from business in Texas if
the taxpayer has its commercial domicile in Texas). Taxpayers may also claim a deduction
from apportioned taxable capital or earned surplus for a portion of its investment in an enter-
prise project or solar energy device. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.1051, 171.107 (Vernon
Supp. 1992).
127. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon Supp. 1992). (H.B. 11 rewrote Tex.
Tax Code Ann. § 171.109 to exclude Section 171.109(i)(e) which had permitted deferred in-
come taxes to be excluded from surplus).
128. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(j)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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fits that are not payable in the current accounting year. 129
The new component of the tax is based on "net taxable earned surplus' 130
and is, in essence, a tax on a corporation's income. A corporation's earned
surplus is based on its reportable federal taxable income, less certain deduc-
tions not including net operating loss deductions. 31 Because this compo-
nent of the tax is calculated by reference to taxable income for federal
income tax purposes, the Tax Code now includes a definition of the Internal
Revenue Code.132 The Texas drafters were concerned that defining the Tax
Code by reference to the Internal Revenue Code as in effect at any future
time would effectively permit federal legislation to modify Texas law, and
thus constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative power. Therefore,
the legislators defined the Internal Revenue Code as in effect for "the federal
tax year beginning on or after January 1, 1990, and before January 1, 1991,
and any regulations adopted under that code applicable to that period."' 33
One of the most significant provisions in the new law is the requirement
that compensation for officers and directors of corporations with more than
thirty-five shareholders be added to taxable income.' 34 This requirement po-
tentially imposes a tax, payable by the corporation, of up to 4.5% of the
compensation of some of its most highly compensated individuals. Although
the thirty-five shareholder restriction is a significant one, there is some flexi-
bility in computing the number of shareholders. For example, the legislature
provided that an approved Employee Stock Ownership Plan controlling a
minority interest and voting through a single trustee is considered one share-
holder,' 35 and the comptroller confirmed orally soon after the legislation
was enacted that a partnership is considered one shareholder, regardless of
the number of its partners.' 36 Some corporations will be able to reduce the
number of their shareholders to thirty-five or fewer, and thereby escape the
129. Id. § 171.109(j)(1). See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
130. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.002(a)(2), 171.110 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
131. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(a), (d).
132. Id. § 171.001(b)(4).
133. Id.
134. See id. § 171.1 10(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1992), which requires a corporation to include
in its computation of net taxable earned surplus "any compensation of officers or directors, or
if a bank, any compensation of directors and executive officers, to the extent excluded in deter-
mining federal taxable income .... " The legislature granted banks relief from the general rule
that, if applicable, would have required adding back the salaries of untold numbers of bank
vice-presidents. Id. The savings and loan industry, on the other hand, must follow the general
rule that compensation of all officers be included in the addback. For a limited liability com-
pany, officer and director includes its directors and managers, and shareholder includes its
members. Id. § 171.001(b)(5), (7).
135. Id. § 171.110(g) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
136. Speculation exists that the comptroller may retract this interpretation and attempt to
"look through" the partnership to its partners. See Tax Policy News (Comptroller, Austin,
Texas) Jan. 1991, at 6 ("[tlhe Comptroller's position is that a separate legal entity holding
shares in a corporation will be treated as one shareholder unless it is determined that the entity
was organized for the primary purpose of holding stock in the corporation."). However, there
appears to be no statutory authority for such a look-through approach. Contrast the legisla-
ture's silence on this partnership issue with the specific legislative provision allowing a limited
look-through in the corporate context. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(c) (Vernon Supp.
1992) (a corporation with fewer than 35 shareholders will be required to add back compensa-
tion if its parent corporation has more than 35 shareholders).
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compensation tax. Although such planning may frustrate the comptroller, a
company decision to buy out minority shareholders or a shareholder deci-
sion to hold shares through a partnership is much like the decision to oper-
ate as a partnership rather than as a corporation: it is a choice of a form that,
under Texas law, should allow certain tax benefits to those who are willing
and able to implement those decisions.
The compensation addback has its origins in early drafts of franchise tax
legislation which would have applied the tax to unincorporated entities as
well as to corporations.137 The addback of certain salaries to corporate taxa-
ble income was intended, at least in part, to put corporations on a more even
footing with unincorporated entities (such as partnerships) whose income
often includes the equivalent of corporate officers' compensation and to
avoid the disparity in calculating taxable income that might otherwise have
existed between corporations and non-corporate entities. Although the legis-
lature opted not to tax non-corporate entities (except for limited liability
companies and other entities specifically included, as noted above), 138 it re-
tained the addback of employee compensation because of the significant rev-
enue involved.139
The tax rates are applied only to the taxable capital and taxable earned
surplus that are apportioned to Texas. 14 The apportionment of capital and
of earned surplus to Texas is based on a single-factor gross receipts formula.
Taxable capital and taxable earned surplus are both apportioned to Texas by
multiplying the corporation's taxable capital by a fraction, the numerator of
which is the corporation's gross receipts from business done in Texas and the
denominator of which is the corporation's gross receipts from its entire busi-
ness.141 The taxable capital test is based on generally accepted accounting
principles, 142 however, and the earned surplus test is based on federal in-
come tax principles. 143 The legislature apparently intended to exclude all
foreign-source income from the earned surplus base and the earned surplus
gross receipts formula.'" However, the statutory language enacted141 ex-
cludes only certain types of foreign-source income, specifically, amounts in-
137. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
139. According to budget numbers provided to legislators, approximately 50% of the in-
creased revenue from the franchise tax is attributable to the compensation addback.
140. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
141. Id. § 171.106(a) as determined under § 171.103 (general rule for gross receipts from
business done in Texas for taxable capital) or § 171.1031 (apportionment of taxable capital and
earned surplus of banking corporations and savings and loan associations). Id. § 171.106(b),
as determined under § 171.1031 (apportionment of taxable capital and earned surplus of bank-
ing corporations and savings and loan associations) or § 171.1032 (determination of gross re-
ceipts from business in Texas for taxable earned surplus).
142. Id. § 171.112(b).
143. Id. § 171.1121(b).
144. The language with respect to foreign income was based on an Ohio statute (OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.04 [ 143-065] (Anderson 1991])); a drafting error resulted in omit-
ting language that would have excluded all foreign source income from the tax base. Legisla-
tors have confirmed this intent informally.
145. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.110(a)(l), 171.1032(b).
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cluded pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 78146 (relating to
deemed dividends to certain domestic corporations) or Sections 951 through
964147 (relating to controlled foreign corporations), and dividends received
from a subsidiary, associate, or affiliated corporation that "does not transact
a substantial portion of its business or regularly maintain a substantial por-
tion of its assets in the United States." 148 The Texas legislature did not
exclude other foreign-source income, such as income earned directly from
foreign sources, and further legislative action would apparently be necessary
to exclude all-foreign-sourced income.
A complex provision of the new law149 allows taxpayers to elect a credit
designed to offer relief to taxpayers who are subject to reporting deferred
income taxes under an accounting standard that, in the absence of the credit
provisions, could result in unfavorable financical reporting requirements for
certain taxpayers.' 50 Although the credit was designed for companies that
have a higher book basis than tax basis for assets, the statutory language
appears to allow a company with a higher tax basis than book basis to claim
a credit. Section 171.111 (b) refers to the difference between the basis used
for financial accounting purposes and the basis used for federal income tax
basis that at some future date will reverse,' 5 1 without specifying that the
difference must result from an excess of book basis over tax basis. The
comptroller, however, is taking the position that no credit is available with
146. 26 U.S.C. § 78 (1999).
147. Id. §§ 951-64.
148. States' ability to tax foreign dividends has given rise to litigation in other states. See,
e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Finance, 465 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1991),petition for
cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3000 (U.S. July 2, 1991) (No. 90-1918) (Iowa tax which excludes from
the tax base dividends from domestic subsidiaries, but not dividends from foreign subsidiaries,
is constitutional); White v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 503 So.2d 296, 303-04 (Ala. Civ. App.
1986), aff'd sub. nom. Ex parte Kimberly-Clark Corp., 503 So.2d 304 (Ala. 1987) (a state is
permitted to tax Internal Revenue Code Section 78 gross up income and Section 951 income).
149. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.111 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
150. Financial Accounting Board Standard 96. A corporation is not permitted to convey,
assign or transfer the election to claim the credit. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.11 l(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1992). A taxpayer that wishes to elect this credit must notify the Comptroller in writing
of its intent to preserve its right to take a credit no later than March 1, 1992. The corporation
may thereafter elect to claim the credit for the current year and any future year at or before the
original due date of any report due after January 1, 1992, until the earlier of (i) corporation's
revoking the election, or (ii) the date the the credit section expires (September 1, 2012 accord-
ing to § 171.111 (i)). Id. A taxpayer that claims this credit is required to pay an additional tax
equal to 0.2 % of the corporation's net taxable capital per year of privilege period. Id.
§ 171. 11 (h). Some confusion arose concerning this "additional tax" because a pre-enactment
version of the relevant statutory language increased the rate of the capital component of the
tax, but did not create a separate "additional tax." The statute provides that a corporation
may claim the credit for not more than 20 consecutive privilege periods beginning with the first
report due after January 1, 1992. Only one election is permissible. Id. § 171.111(a). The
comptroller's position is that the corporation must pay the additional 0.2% tax on net taxable
capital to maintain the election - even for years in which the corporation is unable to utilize
the credit. Comptroller representatives have said that a taxpayer who inadvertently fails to
pay the surtax will therefore be deemed to have revoked its election and will be unable to elect
again to take a credit.
151. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.111(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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respect to assets with a tax basis in excess of book basis. 15 2
Section 171.0021153 of the Tax Code now provides for a credit against the
franchise tax for sales and use taxes paid (i) by a corporation engaged in
manufacturing, processing, fabricating, or repairing tangible personal prop-
erty for ultimate sale or engaged in certain jet turbine engine repairs, over-
hauls and retrofittings, 154 or (ii) for certain property (including certain
manufacturing equipment, replacement parts, or certain equipment used in
connection with jet turbine engines) 5 5 with a useful life in excess of six
months if used or consumed in or during the manufacturing, processing,
fabricating, or repair process.' 5 6 The total amount of the credit against
franchise tax allowed is equal to the sum of (i) twenty-five percent of the
Texas sales and use tax paid for property purchased on or after October 1,
1991, and before January 1, 1993, and (ii) fifty percent of the Texas sales and
use tax paid for property purchased on or after January 1, 1993, and before
October 1, 1993.157
The legislature recognized that companies might escape the tax on earned
surplus by escaping Texas jurisdiction (at least for purposes of the tax on
earned surplus) after the effective date of the tax but prior to year-end. Sec-
tion 171.0011158 is designed to impose an additional tax on a corporation
that is subject to the franchise tax, but which is "no longer subject to the
taxing jurisdiction of this state in relation to the tax on net taxable earned
surplus.' 159 This additional tax is equal to the 4.5% rate on earned surplus
(or whatever the rate on earned surplus is for the year at issue)' 60 multiplied
by the corporation's net taxable earned surplus for the period beginning on
the day after the last day for which the tax imposed on net taxable earned
surplus was computed and ending on the day the corporation is no longer
subject to Texas' taxing jurisdiction on net taxable earned surplus. 16 Is a
corporation that is subject to tax at the beginning of the year, and which
152. According to the instructions that accompany the form promulgated to preserve the
right to the credit:
[t]he credit is for timing differences that exist at the corporation's normal ac-
counting year end in 1991. These differences represent the excess of the basis
used for financial accounting purposes over the the basis used for federal income
tax purposes of qualifying assets or liabilities that at some future date will
reverse.
(emphasis added).
153. Id. § 171.0021.
154. Id. at § 171.0021(a).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. § 171.0021(b)(l), (2). The credit may be claimed on the first franchise tax report
due after January 1, 1994. Id. § 171.0021(c), (d) (gives specific rules with respect to carry-
overs, and provides that a corporation may not convey, assign, or transfer the credit allowed
under this section to another entity). Section 171.0021 expires September 1, 1999. Id.
§ 171.0021(g). Existing law under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (exemptions from sales
tax for certain property used in manufacturing) provides substantial guidance on issues with
respect to the types of qualified property, including with respect to the six-month requirement.





subsequently withdraws completely from the state, subject to the additional
tax? The statutory language could be construed to apply only to corpora-
tions that continue to be subject to the tax on capital, but this section is
likely to be construed to impose a tax on corporations that withdraw com-
pletely from the state during the year. Because this provision was not effec-
tive until January 1, 1992,162 it does not reach corporations that withdrew
from Texas during 1991. The comptroller's 1992 Transition Rule163 is es-
sentially an effort to do what the legislature did not do - make the addi-
tional tax apply to 1991 withdrawals.
3. Criminal Liability for Wilful and Fraudulent Acts.
Section 1 7 1.3 6 3 164 of the Tax Code is a new section that imposes criminal
penalties for "wilful and fraudulent acts."1 65  This section provides that a
corporation commits an offense if it is subject to the franchise tax provisions
and wilfully fails to file a report or to keep required books and records, files
a fraudulent report, violates "any rule of the comptroller for the administra-
tion and enforcement" of the franchise tax provisions, or attempts "in any
other manner to evade or defeat any tax"166 imposed under the franchise tax
statutes. Section 171.363 was apparently intended, at least in part, to en-
courage taxpayers to file all required reports and returns. 167 However, the
language is so broad (especially the references to violating "any rule of the
Comptroller" or attempting "in any other manner to evade or defeat any
tax") 168 that the state could argue that the statute reaches a taxpayer who in
good faith takes a position that is contrary to an administrative rule, or ap-
plies to corporate reorganizations, mergers or other planning devices,
although such an interpretation seems far too broad to justify. The statute
should be construed to apply to fraudulent alteration of the books and
162. H.B. 11, § 8.27.
163. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 3.572 (proposed Nov. 19, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 6847).
See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text.
164. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.363 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
165. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.363(a)(5) parallels Internal Revenue Code Section 7201
(26 U.S.C. § 7201), and TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.363(a)(1), (2) appears to cover types of
offenses that, on a federal level, would be covered by Internal Revenue Code Section 7203 (26
U.S.C. § 7203). It may not be necessary (and may be unwise) to tie the interpretation of the
Texas Tax Code criminal provisions to the Internal Revenue Code, but authority concerning
the Internal Revenue Code sections is instructive because it demonstrates the significant differ-
ence that exists between actions that give rise to criminal liability and those that give rise to
civil liability. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360, 93 S. Ct. 2008, 2017 (1973)
("willfully," in the federal taxing statutes at issue, "generally connotes a voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty" and includes a requirement of "bad faith" or "evil intent").
166. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.363(a)(1)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Criminal penalties
also extend to a person who is an accountant or an agent for a corporation who knowingly
enters false information on the corporation's report. An offense under this section is a felony
of the third degree. See id. § 171.363(b)-(d).
167. A corporation with a tax liability of less than $100 is not considered to owe any tax,
and is not required by the statute to file a tax return. Id. §§ 171.002(d), .2022. However, as
permitted by the Tax Code (TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.204), the comptroller plans to re-
quire all corporations to file a report, thereby eliminating the much touted advantage of al-
lowing small taxpayers to bypass filing requirements.
168. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.363(a)(4), (5) (emphasis added).
TA XATION 21091992]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
records of a company to misrepresent its capital, income or gross receipts, to
fraudulent backdating of documents to establish that a company began do-
ing business, stopped doing business or changed its corporate structure on a
date different from the date that such action actually occurred, and to other
fraudulent activities.1 69 However, a taxpayer that takes a return position
based on an interpretation for which there is some basis should not be
treated as guilty of a wilful or fraudulent act within the meaning of Section
171.363, notwithstanding the existence of an administrative rule that adopts
a contrary interpretation.
E. Regulatory Developments
Comptroller John Sharp's goal of revising all the franchise tax regulations
involves issuing over thirty new or revised rules. The difficult issues
presented by the new franchise tax significantly delayed the release of these
rules and, as of January 1, 1992, none of the rules with respect to the new
franchise tax had been adopted. However, several proposed rules 170 merit
discussion.
One of the comptroller's most controversial proposals is Rule 3.572,171
which purports to impose a supplemental tax on the surviving corporation of
certain mergers and other year-end transfers by requiring the survivor to pay
tax on the non-survivor's income. This requirement that the income of the
non-surviving corporation be included in determining taxable earned surplus
of the survivor is at odds with Decision 26,516172 which notes that, in calcu-
lating the franchise tax of a merger survivor, the receipts of the non-surviv-
ing corporation are not counted for purposes of determining gross receipts.
If the non-survivor's gross receipts are not taken into account in computing
the survivor's tax liability, neither should the non-survivor's income.
The proposed rule was apparently designed both to deter taxpayers from
year-end tax-planning reorganizations and to set forth the comptroller's view
that he has the authority to change administratively the legislatively adopted
effective date for imposing the additional tax due under Section 171.0011,173
to impose an additional tax on the survivors of 1991 mergers and other reor-
ganizations, and to require that such additional taxes be paid by May 15,
169. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,386 (July 2, 1991) illustrates the comptroller's ability to
impose a penalty for such actions (taxpayer assessed 25% penalty pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 151.502 (Vernon 1982) on its sales tax deficiency for altering its records between audi-
tor's visits).
170. The comptroller proposed 15 new franchise tax rules in December 1991. See 16 Tex.
Reg. 7706-21 (Dec. 27, 1991).
171. See 16 Tex. Reg. 6847 (proposed Nov. 26, 1991). Interestingly, this rule was not
issued in emergency form, despite the fact that the comptroller clearly intended it to deter
year-end planning. Therefore, the rule should not have the binding effect on taxpayers that it
might have had if the comptroller had issued it in emergency form. See generally TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act), § 5(a)
(procedure for proposing and adopting rules) and § 5(d) (procedure for adopting emergency
rules).
172. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,516 (Mar. 27, 1991).
173. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0011 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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1992. 174 Because administrative rules cannot expand the statute they pur-
port to interpret, 175 and because Rule 3.572 seeks to expand the legislatively
enacted tax, it should be held invalid if adopted in its proposed form.
The comptroller proposed two new rules176 to set forth the nexus stan-
dards that apply to the new franchise tax. Appropriately, these rules ac-
knowledge that Public Law 96-272177 requires the standard for the earned
surplus component of the tax to differ from the existing standards for appli-
cation of the tax on capital. Proposed Rule 3.546, which describes the nexus
standard as it applies to the capital tax, 178 would replace existing Rule
3.406.179 Current Rule 3.406 provides that a foreign corporation is liable
for the franchise tax if it is authorized to "transact business under a certifi-
cate of authority from the secretary of state"180 pursuant to Article 8.01 of
the Texas Business Corporation Act,' 8 ' or if it is actually doing business
without a certificate. Proposed Rule 3.546 deletes the reference to transact-
ing business and to a certificate of authority and instead provides that a for-
eign corporation is liable for the franchise tax "if it is authorized to do
business in this state or if it is actually doing business in this state."11 82 Elim-
inating the reference to the Texas Business Corporation Act is consistent
with current interpretations of "doing business" as being entirely independ-
ent from "transacting business."' 83 The proposed rule also has different lan-
guage concerning nexus. Rule 3.406(b) provides that a corporation is doing
business in Texas for purposes of franchise tax "when it has constitutional
nexus with Texas for the purpose of franchise taxation." 8 4 The proposed
revised standard provides that:
A corporation is doing business in this state, for the taxable capital
component of the franchise tax, when it has sufficient contact with this
state to be taxed without violating the United States Constitution. A
corporation may be subject to the taxable capital component, but not
subject to the earned surplus component, because of Public Law 86-272.
See § 3.554 of this title (relating to Earned Surplus: Nexus) for the
nexus standards for the earned surplus component of the franchise
174. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.572 (proposed Nov. 19, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 6847). This
provision is intended to accelerate payments for certain corporations, including certain new
corporations, that, under the statute, would not be required to file a franchise tax report until
1993. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.151(a), 171.152(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (a corpora-
tion's initial period ends one year after it begins doing business, and its payment for that period
is due within 90 days thereafter).
175. See, e.g. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bullock, 575 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1978).
176. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.546, 3.554 (proposed Dec. 18, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 7709,
7715).
177. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text
178. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.546(b) (proposed Dec. 18, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 7706, 7709).
179. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.406 (Dec. 1987).
180. Id. § 3.406(a).
181. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.01-.18 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
182. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.546(b) (proposed Dec. 18, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 7706, 7709).
183. Prior to the mid-1980's, many believed, including comptroller representatives, that the
"doing business" standard for franchise tax purposes was the same as the "transacting busi-
ness" standard for a certificate of authority; the reference in the rule to the Tex. Bus. & Com.
Code provided some support for taxpayers' argument that the two standards were the same.




This reformulation is consistent with the legislature's statements that the
franchise tax will reach as far as the United States Constitution will permit it
to reach, 186 and with the fact that Public Law 86-272 will prohibit the im-
position of the income tax component of the new franchise tax, even where
nexus exists, if the activities that constitute nexus are protected under Public
Law 86-272.18 7Proposed Rule 3.546 also sets forth a specific list of activities
which constitute doing business in Texas' 88and confirms that a limited part-
ner in a limited partnership is not doing business in Texas; 189 this list is
substantively the same as in existing Rule 3.406.190
Proposed Rule 3.554191 sets forth the nexus standard for earned surplus
purposes. 192 The cross reference in this rule to the standards in Proposed
Rule 3.546193 may mean that the standards in the two rules are the same
except to the extent Public Law 86-272 mandates a different result; however,
neither proposed rule specifically states that the standards are the same, and
comptroller representatives have indicated orally that the comptroller has
not yet decided whether he believes the standards should be the same.
Nonetheless, regardless of the interpretation ultimately adopted by the
comptroller, the threshold for imposing the income tax should be no differ-
ent from the threshold for imposing the capital tax except for differences
required by Public Law 86-272. Activities that do not constitute doing busi-
ness for purposes of the capital tax should not constitute doing business for
purposes of the income tax. 194
185. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.546(b) (proposed Dec. 18, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 7706, 7709).
186. The legislature's statement in H.B. 11 that the franchise tax "extends to the limits of
the United States Constitution and the federal law adopted under the United States Constitu-
tion" (TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(c) Vernon Supp. 1992)) evidences a trend in Texas to
expand not only the state's taxes but also the state's taxing jurisdiction. See also TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 111.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) ("the conptroller may adopt, repeal, or amend
such rules to reflect changes in the power of this stte to collect taxes.., due to changes in the
constitution or laws of the United States and judicial interpretations thereof." (adopted in
1989)); Id. § 101.002(b) ("[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the jurisdiction and au-
thority of the state to determine the subjects and objects of taxation shall extend to the limits of
the then-current interpretations of the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution
and laws.") (adopted in 1989).
187. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
188. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.546(c) (proposed Dec. 18, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 7706, 7709-
10).
189. Id. § 3.546(c)(12)(B).
190. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.406(c) (Nov. 1988).
191. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.554 (proposed Dec. 18, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 7706, 7715).
192. Id. § 3.554(b).
193. Id.
194. The Comptroller initially confirmed that being a limited partner in a limited partner-
ship does not constitute doing business in Texas for purposes of the earned surplus tax, but
later indicated that the issue is still under review. Taxpayers' apparent willingness to do busi-
ness in partnership rather than corporate form to escape the franchise tax may cause the comp-
troller to revise his view that a corporate limited partner is not doing business in Texas by
virtue of his interest in the partnership. Sharp v. House of Lloyd supra notes 91-98 and accom-
panying text, might provide an incentive for him to set aside the prior interpretation in 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.406(c)(12)(B) concerning limited partnerships or to argue that the
interpretation does not apply to the revised tax. However, the holding in House of Lloyd




A. Application of Tax
As is noted below,195 Senate Bill 351196 created a two-tier tax-levying and
revenue distribution system, and consolidated existing school districts into
county education districts for the sole purpose of exercising some of the tax-
ing power formerly exercised by separate school districts.' 97 In Carrollton-
Farmers Branch Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent
School District. (Edgewood III),191 the Texas supreme court held that the
public school finance system enacted under Senate Bill 351 violates the
Texas Constitution. 199 However, the Texas Supreme Court deferred the ef-
fect of this ruling so as not to interfere with the collection of 1991 and 1992
county education district taxes, requiring that corrective measures be
adopted by the Texas legislature by June 1, 1993 .200
The court ruled the public school finance system unconstitutional on two
grounds. First, the court held that Senate Bill 351 levies a state property tax
in violation of article VIII, section 1-e20 of the Texas Constitution. The
court reasoned that because the Texas legislature mandated county educa-
tion districts to levy taxes, set the tax rate county education districts must
use, and prescribed how county education district tax proceeds must be dis-
tributed, county education district taxes are, in reality, state taxes.202 The
state argued that because taxes levied by county education districts were not
deposited in the state treasury, such taxes are not state taxes. The court
reasoned, however, that the prohibition against state ad valorem taxes would
be meaningless if the prohibition could be avoided by depositing tax pro-
ceeds in some lesser instrumentality's account. 20 3
Second, the court held that the bill levied an ad valorem tax without an
election in violation of article VII, section 3204 of the Texas Constitution.
The state argued that local taxes may be levied without voter approval, and,
alternatively, that article VII, section 3-b2°5of the Texas Constitution, which
does not require an election in instances where boundaries of any independ-
that the state's failure to impose franchise tax on corporations with independent contractors in
Texas did not constitute an administrative policy, whereas the comptroller's treating limited
partners as not doing business in Texas is a clear administrative policy reflected in a duly
promulgated rule. Moreover, the legislature's deliberate enactment of a tax that excludes part-
nerships from the tax base would seem contrary to an attempt to tax the partnerships' income
by looking through to partners that are not otherwise subject to the franchise tax.
195. See infra., notes 254-273 and accompanying text.
196. Act of April 15, 1991, ch. 20, 1991 Tex Sess. Law Serv. 381 (Vernon).
197. See Edgewood I.S.D. v. Meno, No. 362, 516-A (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 345th
Judicial Dist. of Texas, Aug. 7, 1991), rev'd, Carrollton-Farmers Branch I.S.D. v. Edgewood
I.S.D., 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 374 (Jan. 30, 1992).
198. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 374 (Jan. 30, 1992).
199. Id. at 376.
200. Id. at 400-01.
201. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § I-e.
202. Carrollton-Farmers Branch I.S.D., 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 382.
203. Id. at 383.
204. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1876, amended 1883, 1908, 1909, 1918, 1920, 1926).
205. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3-b (1962), amended 1966).
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ent school district are changed by consolidation, excuses the voting require-
ment in this. case because Senate Bill 351 merely consolidates school
districts. Although recognizing that article VII, section 3 is a "constitu-
tional wilderness," the court ruled that the Texas Constitution requires that
voters must approve the tax2° 6 before a county education district levies an ad
valorem tax. In support of its holding, the court relied on the fact that in the
more than seventy years since a relevant amendment has been added to arti-
cle VII, section 3 of the Constitution, the Texas legislature has never acted
as if the Texas Constitution authorizes local ad valorem taxes without voter
approval. 20 7 In addressing the consolidation argument, the court reasoned
that the creation of county education districts did not result in the physical
change of any school district's boundaries. 208
Although virtually every aspect of the Texas supreme court's decision in
Edgewood III is controversial, the court's action to defer the effect of its
decision for over two years has sparked the most debate. While it is not
unusual for a tax to be ruled unconstitutional on a prospective basis,
Edgewood III takes the prospective analysis one step further by requiring the
collection of 1992 taxes, which generally will not be due until January 31,
1993.209 The court was strongly influenced by its belief that retroactive ap-
plication would be so damaging to Texas' school system that retroactivity
could not promote any constitutional purpose. 2 10
There was considerable litigation during the Survey period with respect to
the taxable value of fee interests subject to leases. In Cherokee Water Co. v.
Gregg County Appraisal District 2 1 the taxpayer leased substantial portions
of its property to its shareholders pursuant to annually renewable one year
term lease agreements providing substantially below market rents. The tax-
payer contended that it should have been taxed only on the value of its rever-
sionary interest in the property subject to the leases, which is insubstantial,
given the remote possibility of a lessee's returning possession to the taxpayer.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the taxpayer's argument, reasoning that
there is no statutory basis for taxing property not under lease at full value
but taxing leased property only at the value attributable to the lessor's
206. Carrollton-Farmers Branch LS.D., 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 387.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 389.
209. Id. at 400. In deciding to defer the effect of its holding, the court employed the United
States Supreme Court's test for determining whether a decision should be applied retroac-
tively. Id. at 392-99. See Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). See also supra
notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
210. Carroliton-Farmers Branch IS.D., 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 399. The court stated that a
retroactive holding would cause schools to close, delay payments to teachers and administra-
tors and cause serious damage to children as a result of an interruption of their education. Id.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Doggett (joined by Justice Mauzy) wrote that the majority
"has led the Legislature down the primrose path. Today's unconstitutional legislation is only
yesterday's judicial vision . . ." Id. at 413 (Doggett, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion
concludes that Senate Bill 351 passed constitutional muster, and that the Texas supreme court
in Edgewood II strongly implied that a school financing system in the nature of that adopted
by Senate Bill 351 would be constitutional. Id. at 416-18.




In Irving Independent School District v. Packard Properties, Ltd.2 13 the
United States District Court addressed the validity of liens for unpaid prop-
erty taxes, penalties, interest and attorney's fees that attached to real prop-
erty owned by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
receiver for a failed savings and loan association. 21 4 A provision of the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA) prohibits attachment of an involuntary lien to real property held by
the FDIC as receiver. 2 15 Two taxing authorities sued to collect such taxes,
penalties, interest and attorney's fees for taxes assessed on January 1, 1986
through January 1, 1990 on property owned by the FDIC since January 1,
1989. The court held that the liens for 1986-1988 remain on property be-
cause such liens existed before the FDIC acquired the property.2 16  The
court also recognized the tax lien for 1989 because FIRREA had not been
enacted by January 1, 1989, the date the lien for such taxes first existed. 217
The predecessor statute subjected FDIC real property to local taxation to
the same extent as property owned by other taxpayers. 218 The court barred
the lien for 1990 taxes, reasoning that FIRREA is quite clear in prohibiting
such an involuntary lien.2 19 Finally, the court held that attorney's fees are
recoverable against the FDIC only pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice




The Austin court of appeals in Hays County Appraisal District v. Robin-
son222 addressed whether a tract of land, one-third of which had been used
for crop planting and other agricultural uses, was open-space land. The tax-
212. Id. at 876. The Dallas court of appeals in Dallas Central Appraisal District v. Jagee
Corp., 812 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1991, writ denied), addressed another fact situation
in which the owner of a fee interest in property argued that the taxable value of his interest
should be reduced because it was subject to a long-term lease with substantially below market
rents. Id. at 52. In a different approach than taken by the taxpayer in Cherokee Water, the
taxpayer asserted that taxing the fee owner on the value of the leasehold interest would violate
the ownership and equal protection requirements of the Texas Constitution by taxing it on
property (the lease) that it does not own. See Tex. Const. art. VIII, §§ 1, 11, 21(c). In holding
for the appraisal district, the court stated that the value of the leasehold is subsumed within the
value of the fee estate; thus, being taxed on the leasehold does not result in the fee owner being
taxed on property it does not own. Dallas Central Appraisal Dist., 812 S.W.2d at 52-53.
213. 762 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
214. Id. at 702.
215. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (1989).
216. Irving I.S.D., 762 F. Supp. at 703.
217. Id. at 704. With respect to the 1989 lien, the court discusses only 1989 taxes, and not
interest, penalties and collection fees relating to such taxes. Id. It is unclear why the court
does not expressly recognize a lien for interest, penalties and fees for such 1989 taxes.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
221. Irving I.S.D., 762 F. Supp. at 704. In Fort Bend County Municipal Utility District
No. 30 v. Gayle, 755 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1990), the United States District Court held that
tax foreclosure suits cannot be brought against the FDIC without its consent. Id. at 748. In
addition, the court ruled that the FDIC is not personally liable for penalties, interest or attor-
ney's fees against property acquired by it. Id.
222. 809 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
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payers purchased a thirty-five acre tract of property and applied for an open-
space valuation of the property two years later. In order to obtain open-
space valuation, a property must (i) be currently devoted principally to agri-
cultural use to the degree of intensity generally accepted in the area; and (ii)
have been devoted principally to agricultural use for five of the preceding
seven years. 223 Robinson addressed this second requirement.
The prior owners of the property planted oats and wheat on approxi-
mately one-third of the property, but did not utilize the remainder of the
tract because it was wasteland. The appraisal district contended that be-
cause the property was more suitable for running livestock than other agri-
cultural uses, and because the previous owners farmed only one-third of the
property, the land had not been devoted "principally" to agricultural use for
five of the previous seven years. In holding that the tract met the require-
ments of open-space land, the court reasoned that "intensity of use" should
not be considered in determining whether the subject property has histori-
cally been devoted "principally" to agriculture.224 Because the former own-
ers cultivated the only cultivable land on the property, the historical use test
was met, irrespective of whether the former owners could have engaged in
more productive agricultural uses. 225
In another case dealing with eligibility for open space valuation, the Dal-
las court of appeals in HL Farm Corp. v. Self226 held valid section
23.56(3)227 of the Tax Code, which denies open-space land valuation to land
owned by any legal entity owned primarily by a nonresident alien or foreign
government if such entity is required by federal law to register its ownership
of the land.228 The taxpayer, a Virginia corporation, was a second-tier sub-
sidiary of a Switzerland corporation. Pursuant to the Agricultural Foreign
Investment Disclosure Act, the taxpayer was required to register its owner-
ship of the land at issue with the United States.229 The taxpayer challenged
the taxing unit's denial of open-space land designation for the land on the
basis that section 23.56(3) violated (i) the Texas constitutional provision es-
tablishing special valuation for open-space land, 230 (ii) the equal protection
clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions, 23' and (iii) the require-
ment of equal and uniform taxation under the Texas Constitution.232
The court rejected each of these arguments. First, the court concluded
that the general purpose of allowing special appraisal for open-space land is
223. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51(1) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
224. Id., citing Riess v. Williamson County Appraisal District, 735 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
225. Id. at 332.
226. 820 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App,-Dallas 1991, writ requested).
227. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.56(3) (Vernon 1982).
228. Id.
229. 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988).
230. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § l-d-I (commonly referred to as a "l-d-l valuation").
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 3.
232. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § I.
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to preserve and benefit the family farm. 233 The court indicated that the sec-
tion 23.56(3) exclusion of non-resident aliens from open-space land qualifica-
tion actually furthered the goal of preserving and benefiting the family
farm. 234 In addressing the equal protection clauses as they relate to section
23.56(3), the court stated that states may use classifications in assessing taxes
so long as a rational basis supports the classification. 235 The court con-
cluded that the concerns prompting the enactment of the Agricultural For-
eign Investment Disclosure Act (such as a concern that foreign owners are
more likely to sell out to developers of non-farm projects) 236 reflect threats
to Texas family farmers, and provide a rational basis to support section
23.56(3).237 Finally, with regard to the taxpayer's third argument, the court
noted that the Constitution does not require absolute equality in taxation,
and concluded that a rational basis exist for assessing the value of land
owned by non-resident aliens differently. 238
B. Procedure
In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Midland Central Appraisal District 239
the El Paso court of appeals held that the taxpayer's suit to determine which
of two counties was the legal situs of its aircraft for property tax purposes
was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust the taxpayer's administrative
remedies. 240 Two counties sought to tax the aircraft - the county in which
hangar space was rented for the aircraft, and the county in which the lessee
of the aircraft had built a hangar and airstrip for the aircraft. Although the
taxpayer had never filed a formal protest with either county appraisal dis-
233. HL Farm Corp., 820 S.W.2d at 375, citing Gragg v. Cayuga Indep. School Dist., 539
S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 973 (1976).
234. HL Farm Corp.,820 S.W. 2d at 376.
235. Id. at 375. See also Alexander Ranch, Inc. v. Central Appraisal District, 733 S.W.2d
303, 307 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026 (1988)
(holding that section 23.56(3) does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution).
236. See H.R. Rep. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-21 (1978).
237. HL Farm Corp., 820 S.W.2d at 376.
238. Id. In a strong dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Enoch stated that there is no rational
basis for denying the taxpayer the open-space designation, and that preserving the family farm
is not the purpose of section 1-d-1. Id. at 376-77.
There were two other interesting cases during the Survey period addressing the require-
ments of open-space land. In Dallas County Appraisal Review Board v. Seven Investment
Co., 813 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ granted (35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 174)), the
Dallas court of appeals held that merely because a portion of a farm could not be used for
agricultural purposes during the year because the county was building a road on it does not
prevent such area from qualifying as open-space land. Id. at 202. Rather, the taxpayer must
clearly demonstrate an intent to permanently give up agriculture, which would not occur until
the road construction was completed. Id. at 202-03. The Houston (1st District) court of ap-
peals held in Pizzitola v. Galveston County Central Appraisal District, 808 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, no writ), that the operation of a bee hive on three acres of
land did not result in the entire tract being classified as open-space land (even though the bees
foraged the remaining tract) because there was no evidence of any human effort being used
with respect to the care of bees on the other portion of the tract. Id. at 248- 49.
239. 808 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991), reversed, in part, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 25
(1991) (reversing the lower court with respect to damages only).
240. Id. at 174.
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trict, the taxpayer filed suit against both taxing authorities seeking a judicial
determination of the aircraft's legal situs. The taxpayer argued that the suit
should not be dismissed because the administrative provisions of the Tax
Code are unconstitutional in that they deny taxpayers the right to challenge
in one forum the conflicting tax claims of separate counties. 241 The court
ruled that neither the Texas nor the United States Constitutions require a
single forum to be provided for resolving conflicting claims between various
taxing units. 242
The Texarkana court of appeals in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Williamson
County Appraisal District243 held that the amendments to section 42.08 of
the Tax Code in 1989, one of which allows taxpayers to pay in full amounts
due under the order being appealed, were intended to be retroactive. 2 " The
taxpayer acquired the property at issue by foreclosure. The prior owner of
the property had timely filed a notice of protest concerning the property's
taxable value, and had complied with the partial tender requirements of sec-
tion 42.08 of the Tax Code (as then in effect) 245 by paying, prior to delin-
quency, the taxes due on the undisputed amount of value. In 1987, while
intervening in this case, the taxpayer also paid the remaining amount of
taxes due on the property. At that time, section 42.08 (as interpreted by
courts) precluded a taxpayer's right to contest the appraised value of prop-
erty if it paid in full the assessed taxes. 246 However, in 1989, the statute was
amended to allow full payment of the taxes due under the order being ap-
pealed without forfeiting the taxpayer's right to a final determination of the
appeal. 247 The court ruled that the 1989 amendments were specifically given
retroactive effect. 248
241. Id. at 171. Specifically, the taxpayer asserted that the administrative requirements of
the Tax Code violated the due process requirements of the United States and Texas Constitu-
tions, the open court requirements of the Texas Constitution and the prohibition against
double taxation requirements of the Texas Constitution. Id.
242. Id. at 172-74. The court ruled that due process simply affords a right to be heard
before final assessment and does not set forth a required review mechanism. Id. at 172. The
court reasoned that the Tax Code's failure to provide a single forum in taxpayer's case does not
violate the Texas Open Courts provision because such provision applies only to common law
suits. Id. Finally, with respect to the double taxation argument, the court pointed out that it
was the taxpayer's failure to comply with administrative provisions for challenging a taxing
unit's actions that resulted in double taxation, not the administrative provisions themselves.
Id. at 173.
243. 816 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ filed Sept. 26, 1991).
244. Id. at 454.
245. See Property Tax Code Act, ch. 841, § 42.08, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 2310, repealed by
Act of 1989, ch. 796, § 43, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3604.
246. Id. See Hunt County Tax Appraisal District v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 719 S.W.2d 215,
219 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussed in Cynthia M. Ohlenforst & Jeff W.
Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 633, 654-55 (1988)).
247. Act of 1989, ch. 798, § 43, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 3604.
248. Resolution Trust, 816 S.W.2d at 454. See also Seven Investment Co., 813 S.W.2d at
203 (reaching same conclusion as Resolution Trust with respect to this issue).
In another case interpreting Section 42.08, the Dallas court of appeals in Filmstrips and
Slides, Inc. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, 806 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no
writ), held that the taxpayer's suit challenging the appraised value of its property was properly
dismissed. Contrary to the procedural requirements set forth in section 42.08 of the Tax Code
for appealing a determination of the appraisal review board, the taxpayer did not pay taxes on
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In Burnet County Appraisal District v. J.M. Huber Corp. 2 4 9 the Austin
court of appeals considered whether a letter from a taxpayer to the appraisal
district disagreeing with the appraisal district's determination of the value of
a property constituted a notice of protest under section 41.4425o of the Tax
Code. The appraisal district contended that the letter did not constitute a
valid notice of protest because it was filed with the appraisal district, not the
appraisal review board. Section 41.44(d)2 5I requires that a notice of protest
must be filed with the appraisal review board having authority to hear the
protest.252 Relying on the fact that the appraisal district and the appraisal
review board share the same staff, address and office, and on the general
principle that doubts about the meaning of a law should be resolved in favor
of taxpayers, the court held that such letter qualified as a notice of protest.2 53
C. Legislation
The Texas legislature passed numerous procedural and substantive prop-
erty tax provisions during its 1991 regular session and special sessions. The
most dramatic of these provisions is contained in Senate Bill 351,254 which
creates new taxing authorities called county education districts in an attempt
to meet the Texas Supreme Court mandate, set forth in the Edgewood 25 5
cases, to equalize public education funding.2 56 Although the Texas Supreme
Court held this rule unconstitutional, the effect of the court's ruling has been
deferred so as not to interfere with collection of 1991 and 1992 county edu-
cation district taxes.25 7
Under the Senate Bill 351 system of funding public schools, each school
district uses a combination of funds from school district property taxes,
county education district property taxes and state revenues to (i) provide a
the property subject to the appeal before the delinquency date. Id. at 290. The taxpayer con-
tended that it should have been given the opportunity to cure its delinquency before dismissal.
Id. The court disagreed, stating that taxpayers must pay before the delinquency date or forfeit
their appeal. Id.
249. 808 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
250. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.44 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
251. Id. § 41.44(d).
252. Id.
253. Burnet County Appraisal Dist., 808 S.W.2d at 616. The court also considered whether
the letter itself met the requirements of a notice of protest. Although no formal protest form
was used and the letter did not identify itself as protest, the court held that the letter met the
requirements under section 41.44(d) of the Tax Code because it identified both the property
owner and the property that is the subject of the protest, and indicated apparent dissatisfaction
with some determination of the appraisal office. Id. at 615. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.44(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1992).
254. Act of April 15, 1991, ch. 20, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 381 (Vernon).
255. Edgewood I.S.D. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Edgewood I); Edgewood
I.S.D. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood II). Senate Bill 351 was not the Texas
legislature's first attempt to establish an efficient school financing system after the issuance of
Edgewood I. In response to Edgewood I, the 71st legislature passed Senate Bill 1, which was
designed to reform Texas' public school financing system. However, in Edgewood II the Texas
Supreme Court held that the system remained unconstitutional even after the enactment of
Senate Bill 1. Edgewood I.S.D., 804 S.W.2d at 496.
256. Edgewood I.S.D., 777 S.W.2d at 397 (addressing Texas public school financing before
enactment of Senate Bill 1).
257. See supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
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basic education program meeting certain legal standards (Tier One) and (ii)
supplement the basic program at a level of its choice and with access to
additional funds for facilities (Tier Two).258 Tier One is financed primarily
from county education district property taxes. 259 Each county education
district is composed of all school districts whose administrative offices are
located in the county (except that in many cases counties are grouped to-
gether to form a single county education district).2 6° Each county education
district is an independent school district established for the limited purpose
of (i) exercising a portion of the taxing power previously authorized by vot-
ers in school districts from which such county education district is com-
posed, and (ii) distributing the county education district's revenue to such
school districts. 261 County education districts are required to levy ad
valorem taxes at specified rates set forth in section 16.252262 of the Educa-
tion Code and must do so by September 1 of each year. 263 Pursuant to sec-
tion 16.252264 of the Education Code, each county education district must
raise its total local share of the foundation school program.265 A county
education district's share of the foundation school program equals the prod-
uct of (i) the taxable value of property in such district for the prior tax year,
and (ii) a specified tax rate for each hundred dollars of valuation, equalling
$0.72 for the 1991-92 school year, $0.82 for the 1992-93 school year, $0.92
for the 1993-94 school year and $1.00 for each school year thereafter. 266
School districts still have the authority to levy property taxes; however, a
school district's total effective tax rate on each $100 valuation of taxable
property cannot exceed $1.50 less the tax rate per $100 valuation levied by
the relevant county education district. 267 Higher rates can be imposed under
certain circumstances to the extent necessary to pay principal and interest on
debt.268
Pursuant to subsection 312.002(e) 269 of the Tax Code, county education
districts are not eligible to enter into tax abatement agreements under the
Property Redevelopment and Tax Abatement Act.270 However, tax abate-
ment agreements entered into by school districts before September 1, 1991
apply to the relevant county education district. 27'
258. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
259. Id.
260. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.941(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Boundaries of county
education districts can be changed to ensure that no district has a taxable value of property in
excess of $280,000 per weighted student in average daily attendance or a value set by a school
fund committee. Id. § 20.941(c).
261. Id. § 20.942.
262. Id. § 16.252.
263. Id. § 20.945.
264. Id. § 16.252.
265. Id. § 16.252(d).
266. Id. § 16.252(a).
267. Id. § 20.09(a).
268. Id. § 20.09(d).
269. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.002(e) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
270. Id.
271. Id. § 312.002(e), (f)
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Texas voters approved a Texas constitutional amendment in August 1991
authorizing county education districts to adopt, by election, a property tax
exemption for residence homesteads of no less than $5,000 and no more than
twenty percent of the property's market value. 27 2 In addition, Texas voters
approved a homestead exemption of $3,000 for persons 65 years of age or
older and disabled persons.27 3
There were a myriad of other important property tax provisions enacted
during 1991. For example, the Texas legislature created new exemptions,
while modifying some exemptions already in place. In November 1991,
Texas voters approved a constitutional amendment authorizing the Texas
legislature to exempt property owned by a nonprofit corporation organized
to supply water or to provide waste water services if the corporation's by-
laws provide that on dissolution its assets remaining after discharge of debt
shall be transferred to an exempt entity that provides a water supply or
waste water service, or both.2 7 4 Pursuant to section 11.30,275 the Texas leg-
islature exempted such property.276
New subsection 11.18(d)(17)277 of the Tax Code provides that property
owned by a public television station producing or broadcasting public inter-
est programming and which receives grants from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting is eligible for exemption. 278 Amended subsection 11.23(a)279
alters the exemption for veteran's organizations. Prior to amendment, the
subsection exempted buildings owned by certain veteran's organizations
(such as the American Legion) that are not used to produce revenues or held
for gain. 280 As amended, the subsection exempts buildings and other prop-
erty not used to produce revenues or held for gain that are owned by non-
profit organizations composed primarily of veteran's organizations chartered
or incorporated by the United States.28 1 The freeport exemption was
amended to provide that the term "freeport goods" has the definition pro-
vided in the article VIII, section 1-j of the Texas Constitution.28 2 Under
prior law, the definition of "freeport goods" under section 11.251 did not
track the Texas Constitution; the wording differences between the two defini-
tions created confusion in some of the taxing jurisdictions. 283 Finally, prop-
erty used for wildlife management now qualifies for open-space valuation. 284
272. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § l-b(e).
273. Id. § l-b(b).
274. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-k. See North Alamo Water Supply Corp., 804 S.W.2d 894
(Tex. 1991) (holding that under prior law water supply corporations were not exempt from
property tax under prior law).
275. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.30 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
276. Id.
277. Id. § 11.18(d)(17).
278. Id.
279. Id. § 11.23(a).
280. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.23(a) (Vernon 1982), repealed by Act of 1991, ch. 162,
§ 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 773 (Vernon).
281. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
282. Id. § 11.251.
283. See TEX CONST. art VIII, § 1-j.
284. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.51 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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In addition to amending and creating exemptions, the legislature made
other important changes to substantive property tax law provisions. Section
25.21285 of the Tax Code was amended to provide that the chief appraiser
may seek to tax real property that was omitted from an appraisal roll in any
one of the five preceding years. 286 Prior to amendment, the section allowed
the chief appraiser to tax property omitted from an appraisal roll during any
one of the preceding ten years.2 87 The period of time to correct clerical and
other errors on an appraisal roll has been lengthened from three years to five
years.288 The scope of property covered by the omitted property statutes
was narrowed from property that "escaped taxation" to property that was
omitted from an appraisal roll. 2 8 9
There were also several legislative changes with respect to tax liens.
Amended section 32.03290 of the Tax Code provides that a tax lien on per-
sonal property is not effective against a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness or a bona fide purchaser for value. 291 Prior law merely provided that
such liens were not effective against bona fide purchasers. 292 Amended sub-
section 32.05(C) 2 9 3 now provides that a property tax lien is inferior to restric-
tive covenants running with the land and valid easements of record recorded
prior to January 1 of the year the tax lien arose. 294
Although there were several substantive property tax legislative changes
made in 1991 in addition to the legislation relating to school taxes, the
number and scope of procedural changes was much more comprehensive.
One important change was the transfer of the State Property Tax Board's
duties and assets to the comptroller. 295
Pursuant to new article 8886,296 an individual may not perform property
tax consulting services for compensation unless the individual registers with
the Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation; 297 however, attorneys,
certified public accountants, certain real estate brokers, in-house consultants
and certain other individuals are exempt from the registration require-
285. Id. § 25.21.
286. Id. § 25.21(a).
287. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.21(a) (Vernon 1982) (prior to amendment by Act of 1991,
ch. 367, § 1, 1991 Tex Sess. Law Serv. 1417 (Vernon)).
288. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
289. Id. § 25.21.
290. Id. § 32.03.
291. Id.
292. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.05 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (prior to amendment by Act of
1991, ch. 617, § 12, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2248 (Vernon) and Act of 1991, ch. 836, § 5.2,
1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2893 (Vernon)).
293. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.05(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
294. Id. See also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.01(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (addressing re-
strictive covenants and easements in connection with the sale of property).
295. Act of June 16, 1991, ch. 843, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2905 (Vernon); Act of Aug.
29, 1991, 2nd C.S., ch. 6, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 26-41 (Vernon).
296. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8886 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
297. Id. § 2(a). "Property tax consulting services" is defined as preparing a property tax
rendition or report for another person, representing another person in a protest, consulting
another person concerning a protest or the preparation of a property tax rendition or report,
negotiating or entering an agreement with an appraisal district on behalf of another concerning
a protested matter, or acting as the designated agent of a property owner. Id. § l(a)(7).
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ment. 298 Persons have until September 1, 1992 to register and obtain a li-
cense from the department. 299  Senate Bill 7723o made numerous
procedural changes to the Property Tax Code. Amended section 41.66(b) 301
now expressly provides that each party to an appraisal review board hearing
is entitled to offer evidence, examine or cross-examine witnesses and other
parties and present argument.30 2 Section 42.29303 was amended to increase
the amount of attorney's fees that may be awarded from the greater of
$5,000 or 20 percent of the amount of taxes in dispute to the greater of
$15,000 or 20 percent of the total amount by which the taxpayer's tax liabil-
ity is reduced as a result of the appeal (but not to exceed the total amount by
which the taxpayer's tax liability is reduced as a result of the appeal). 30 4
Pursuant to new subsection 31.01(j)30 5 of the Tax Code, mortgagees who
receive tax bills must mail a copy of the bill to the property owner within 30
days of receipt. 30 6
New subsection 1.04(18)307 defines the term "clerical error" as any mis-
take or failure in writing, copying, transcribing, entering or retrieving com-
puter data, computing or calculating, and any error that prevents an
appraisal roll or tax roll from reflecting accurately a determination of the
chief appraiser, appraisal review board or assessor, but does not include mis-
takes in judgment or reasoning in making a finding or determination.30 8
This definition comes into play under section 25.25(b),30 9 which addresses
the procedures to correct errors on the appraisal roll. Amended subsection
25.25(d) 310 provides that a taxpayer or the chief appraiser may motion to
change the appraisal roll to correct a significant error, i.e., an error resulting
in an appraised value exceeding by more than one-third the correct ap-
praised value.311 If the roll is changed as a result of such motion, the tax-
payer is required to pay to each affected taxing unit a late-correction penalty
of ten percent of the taxes as recalculated on the basis of the corrected ap-
298. Id. § 2(d).
299. Act of 1991, ch. 869 § 5, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2979 (Vernon). Effective Febru-
ary 1, 1995, a registered property tax consultant may not perform property tax consulting
services for compensation unless the individual is employed by or associated with a registered
senior property tax consultant. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8886, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp.
1992). To qualify as a registered senior property tax consultant, a person must meet all of the
requirements for a registered property tax consultant plus (i) obtain at least 25 credits (given
for various courses and degrees), (ii) have performed property tax consulting services as its
primary occupation for at least four of the last seven years, and (iii) pass an examination
administered by the department. Id. § 3(c).
300. Act of June 16, 1991, ch. 836, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2890 (Vernon).
301. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.66(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
302. Id.
303. Id. § 42.29.
304. Id.
305. Id. § 31.01(j).
306. Id.
307. Id. § 1.04(18).
308. Id.
309. Id. § 25.25(b).





IV. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES TAX
In E-Systems, Inc. v. Pogue 313 the Fifth Circuit held that the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974314 (ERISA) preempts
Texas' administrative services tax on fees received by persons administering
welfare benefit plans and violates the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
United States Constitution.315 Therefore, Texas could not collect the ad-
ministrative services tax from employers' self-insured and self-administered
employee welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA.316 The administrative
services tax (established pursuant to the Texas Administrative Services Tax
Act)317 imposes a 2.5 percent annual tax on insurance carriers and others
recipients of administrative or services fees, consideration, payments, premi-
ums, funds, reimbursements, or compensation for providing services for em-
ployer-employee, multiple employer-employee, self-insurance group,
member, and other medical, accident, sickness, injury, indemnity, death, or
health benefit plans. 318 The court reasoned that the administrative services
tax is imposed on plans nearly identical to plans covered by ERISA, and
that ERISA preempts every state law relating to an employee benefit plan
covered by ERISA.319
V. PROCEDURE
Comptroller representatives frequently issue advisory letters in reply to
specific requests by taxpayers or taxpayers' representatives. This ruling pro-
cess, which has existed for many years, is much less formal and generally
significantly faster than the Internal Revenue Service ruling process.
Although the Tax Code does not require the comptroller to follow these
rulings, he has a longstanding administrative policy of allowing a taxpayer
who received a ruling to rely on it. Although this ruling process is likely to
remain extraordinarily helpful to taxpayers, it appears likely to change
somewhat during 1992. The comptroller's efforts to issue responses quickly
to questions about the new franchise tax resulted in the issuance of some
rulings that were later withdrawn pending further analysis of the issues in-
volved. The effort to bring greater substantive consistency to the ruling pro-
cess, as well as the effort to avoid issuing rulings prematurely has already
resulted in a more thorough review process which has, in turn, extended the
312. Id.
313. 929 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 3404
(1991).
314. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
315. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
316. E-Systems, 929 F.2d at 1103-04.
317. Act of July 21, 1987, 70th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 5, art. 8, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 9, 28-
31 (amended 1989) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 4.1 la (Vernon Supp. 1992)).
318. TEX. INS. CODE art. 4.1IA, § I (Vernon Supp. 1992).
319. E-Systems, 929 F.2d at 1103.
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time required to obtain a ruling. Moreover, the new ethics bill3 20 may make
it more difficult for taxpayers to obtain rulings on a no-names basis.
Although taxpayers and their representatives may still submit ruling re-
quests on a "no-names" basis, the new lobbyist registration requirements are
likely to require the taxpayer or representative to file a lobbying report. 321
In addition to revising the sales and franchise tax rules, the comptroller is
revising several procedural rules. Some revisions are substantive,322 so tax-
payers should take care to review these procedural rules as well as the other
regulatory and legislative changes made during the Survey period.
320. Act of 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch 304, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1290 (Vernon).
321. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 305.003(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
322. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5 (proposed Dec. 30, 1991, 17 Tex. Reg. 98)
(returning final consideration of penalty and interest waiver requests to the administrative
hearings process).
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